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1. Introduction 
In this paper we consider decision errors in consumers’ switching decisions. 
Such  errors  have  important  consequences  for  consumer  protection  and 
competition authorities; they not only damage consumers’ welfare directly by 
limiting their ability to trade with the firm offering the highest surplus on the 
market,  but  they  indirectly  reduce  total  consumer  welfare  by  increasing 
market power. Consumer errors can increase equilibrium profit mark-ups by 
weakening the relationship between firms’ sales and relative surplus offerings 
(Perloff and Salop 1985, Gabaix et al 2005)1.  
 
Despite  their  apparent  importance,  evidence  of  consumers’  errors  in  the 
market place remains scarce and controversial. In this paper, we both confirm 
the  existence  of  such  mistakes  and  provide  evidence  to  suggest  that  they 
result from a form of consumer irrationality. Through the use of a dataset of 
switching choices made in the UK residential electricity market we consider 
three types of consumer decision errors.  As we shall later discuss, previous 
studies have found evidence of “under-switching” errors where a consumer 
does not switch despite apparent benefits available from doing so (perhaps 
due  to  switching  costs),  and  “over-switching”  errors  where  a  consumer 
switches despite making losses from doing so; we also consider a third type of 
error. We define consumer “inaccuracy” when a consumer makes a surplus 
improving switch, but makes an error in the choice of destination firm by not 
                                                 
1 Indeed, Gabaix et al show that if errors are made in consumer decisions as a result of noisy 
product  evaluations  then  the  resulting  equilibrium  profit  mark-ups  converge  to  a  strictly 
positive value as the number of firms tends to infinity for many common noise distributions.   3 
choosing the firm which offers the highest available market surplus (perhaps 
as a result of search costs). Our results show evidence of all three types of 
mistakes.  Of  the  87%  of  consumers  in  our  sample  that  did  not  choose  to 
switch, 99% could have saved an average of £43.54 per annum by switching 
(under-switching). A third of those consumers who chose to switch, switched 
to a more expensive supplier, losing an average of £16.53 per annum as a 
result (over-switching). In aggregate, the switching consumers appropriated 
only a quarter of the total gains available (over-switching and inaccuracy). 
 
Previous studies have asserted that the existence of consumer mistakes does 
not violate the axiom of rationality. They provide evidence that mistakes are 
much more likely to arise from fully optimal behaviour with incorrect beliefs 
or information, rather than a cognitive failure to make an optimal decision. 
Economides et al (2005) suggest that switching errors result from consumers’ 
perceptions of quality differences between firms; while Miravete (2003) shows 
that  some  similar  errors  in  tariff  choices  can  occur  due  to  consumers’ 
uncertainty over their own demand. However, such rational explanations of 
mistakes are inconsistent with our findings that consumer decisions are less 
efficient  in  regions  of  the  UK  where  the  number  of  competitors  is  larger, 
ceteris paribus. Instead, this pattern seems more consistent with an ‘irrational’ 
explanation, in which consumers suffer an “information-overload” due to the 
higher decision complexity resulting from an increased number of options.  
   4 
By  exploring  apparently  irrational  consumer  behaviour  and  its  possible 
effects this paper challenges orthodox competition policy by asserting that, in 
certain circumstances, consumers can be harmed by increases in choice, and 
adds to the growing literature and policy debate which emphasises the role of 
consumers  as  active  participants,  rather  than  passive  recipients,  of 
competition policy (e.g. Gans 2005, DTI 2004).   
 
In section 2 we motivate and discuss our empirical approach. The dataset and 
variable construction are discussed in section 3 and our analysis in section 4. 
Section 5 provides a discussion, including some policy implications.  
 
2. Empirical Motivation and Methodology 
 
Previous  literature  has  paid  little  attention  to  the  accuracy  of  consumer 
decisions, and has focussed solely on errors in the propensity of consumer to 
switch  suppliers2.  Only  Economides  et  al  (2005)  consider  consumer  over-
switching, while for some time the switching cost literature has focussed on 
evidence of consumer under-switching. 3  
 
Economides  et  al  (2005)  analysed  the  decisions  made  by  a  sample  of 
households  in  New  York  State’s  local  telephone  market  between  1999  and 
                                                 
2 Although, Waddams Price (2003) reports some early findings from a dataset which overlaps 
with that used in this paper.  
3 There also exists a wider, related set of evidence considering consumers’ mistakes when 
choosing between tariff options offered by a single firm. For example, Lambrecht and Skiera 
(2004) consider consumers at a German internet provider. They show that 48% of consumers 
have a flat rate bias, paying an average 95% excess in fees and 8% of consumers show a pay 
per  use  bias,  paying  an  average  of  63%  more,  even  5  months  after  their  choice  of  tariff. 
Miravete (2003) argues, however, that consumers in the US telephone market are less prone 
to bias. 
   5 
2003. Of the 592 consumers in the sample who switched to AT&T, 44% made 
an apparent loss, of an average $4.24 per month, while of the 218 consumers 
who switched to MCI, 36% made a loss of, on average, $4.59 per month. The 
authors only consider rational explanations for the apparent mistakes, and 
suggest  that  perceptions  of  differences  in  product  quality  are  a  more 
important explanation of consumer errors than uncertainty over their own 
demand, as the frequency of mistakes made between firms is greater than the 
frequency  of  mistake  made  between  tariffs  at  a  single  firm  (although  the 
average magnitude of these mistakes is similar). The authors utilise the panel 
nature  of  their  dataset  to  model  the  simultaneous  choice  of  tariff  choices 
(across firms) and consumption, while accounting for unobserved levels of 
firm quality. The apparent consumer mistakes can be partially explained as 
the model estimates show the measured mistakes to be offset by a perception 
among consumers of higher quality at the new firms.  
 
In contrast to Economides et al’s approach we aim to identify whether or not 
mistakes can be attributed to rational explanations by exploiting the ‘natural’ 
variation  of  the  number  of  competitors  in  each  regional  market  which 
resulted from the liberalisation of the UK electricity market (further discussed 
in section 3). This variation provides us with an opportunity to discriminate 
between rational and irrational explanations of mistakes by analysing how 
the  number  of  options  faced  by  consumers  affects  the  efficiency  of  their 
decisions. Although an increased number of firms may increase competitive 
pressures and affect the gains available in the market, we would not expect the   6 
number of firms per se to influence the efficiency of a rational consumer’s 
decision  amongst  those  gains.  Errors  due  to  ‘rational’  reasons  such  as 
perceived  quality  differences  or  uncertain  consumer  demand  should  be 
independent  of  the  number  of  firms  in  the  market.  However,  an  inverse 
relationship between decision efficiency and the number of consumer options 
would  exist  if  mistakes  arise  from  an  information-overload.  Findings  in 
behavioural  economics  and  psychology  have  suggested  that  an  increased 
number  of  options  may  increase  the  complexity  of  the  decision  so  that 
decisions become prone to decision noise and inefficient4.  
 
The UK electricity market is particularly appropriate for analysing consumer 
mistakes because it allows us to measure accurately the level of consumers’ 
errors. The homogeneous nature of electricity helps to identify pure mistakes 
by reducing the role of non-price explanations, as consumers should make 
their  decisions  for  tariff-related  reasons  only.  Firms’  marketing  strategies 
reflect this homogeneity through their overwhelming emphasis on potential 
savings. Our sample of consumers viewed the differences in the quality of 
service  between  firms  as  negligible.  When  asked  for  their  reasons  for 
switching,  only  6%  of  the  switching  consumers  named  differences  in  the 
quality  of  product  or  service  between  firms  as  important,  while  77%  of 
                                                 
4 For evidence of increased decision noise see Swait and Adamowicz (2001a,b) and Iyengar 
and Lepper (2000), while additional decision deferral effects, as a result of complexity have 
been  documented  by  Tversky  and  Shafir  (1992), and  Dhar  (1997a,b).  Iyengar  and  Lepper 
showed that consumers were significantly less satisfied and more regretful of their decisions 
from a choice set of 24-30 possible jams, than when decisions were made from a set of 6 jams.    7 
switching consumers named differences in price 5. Differences in the quality 
and  reliability  of  electricity  supply  arise  from  the  vertically  separated 
distribution  function  and  so  are  not  relevant  at  the  retail  level.  A  full 
summary is provided in Table 1.   
 
Table 1: Reasons for Switching Suppliers 
 
 
Reason for switching Mean (st.dev)
Cheaper 0.77 0.42
Dual Supply Discounts 0.11 0.31
Influence of Sales Agent 0.10 0.30
Other 0.05 0.21
'Conned'/Unaware of switching 0.04 0.19
Poor service from old supplier 0.03 0.18
Better Service 0.02 0.12
Easier/Convenient 0.01 0.10
No Standing Charge 0.01 0.10
Incentives 0.00 0.05
N 394  
 
We  explore  whether  consumers’  errors  are  related  to  the  number  of 
competing firms in a way consistent with consumer confusion by formulating 
two  hypotheses.  Our  first  hypothesis  concerns  the  consumers’  decision  to 
switch  suppliers.  Rational  consumers’  switching  decisions  should  be 
consistent with hypothesis 1, while in contrast hypothesis 1 should be rejected 
if consumers are affected by information overload effects. 
 
Hypothesis 1:   For  any  given  available  gains,  a  consumers’  decision  to  switch 
suppliers is independent of the number of firms competing in the market.   
 
                                                 
5 In later regressions, we control for this 6% of switching consumers by including a dummy 
variable, SERVICE. 
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Our second hypothesis, concerns the accuracy of switching consumers’ choice 
of  supplier.  Again,  rational  consumers  should  behave  in  a  way  consistent  
with the hypothesis, while conversely we should reject the hypothesis if the 
increased numbers of firms confuse the consumer6. 
 
Hypothesis 2:  For  any  given  gains  available,  the  gains  made  by  a  switching 
consumer are independent of the number of firms competing in the market. 
 
To  consider  hypothesis  1,  we  analyse  the  decision  to  switch  suppliers  by 
modifying an estimation approach used in the switching cost literature7. We 
estimate  a  binary  choice  model  to  explain  the  probability  of  a  consumer 
switching suppliers as shown by equation (1).  
 








i x  measures the maximum monetary gains available from switching, 
given the consumer’s current supplier, the cheapest available supplier and the 
consumer’s consumption pattern;
D
i x  is a vector of any personal demographics 
                                                 
6 One may suppose that the existence of search costs could prompt a rational consumer to 
violate hypothesis 2. However optimal search theory shows that this is incorrect. If n firms 
offer gains to consumer i as draws from a common distribution function  ) (x F and if consumer i has a 
marginal  search  cost  of  c>0,  then  the  optimal  reservation  price  rule  with  recall,  r,  solves  
∫ = -
¥
r c x dF r x ) ( ) ( , which is independent of n (Lipmann and McCall, 1976). 
7 For example, Chen and Hitt (2002), Kiser (2002), Sturluson (2002) and Giulietti et al (2005).    9 
which  might  affect  switching  costs  and  i N  is  the  number  of  active  firms 
within consumer i’s region8.   
 
The  estimation  of  equation  (1)  shows  us  two  things.  Firstly,  we  can 
understand  if  consumers’  decisions  to  switch  suppliers  are  related,  as  we 
would expect, to the monetary gains available. Decisions will be related to the 
gains  available  if  the  coefficient  P b  is  (significantly)  positive.  Previous 
findings typically show that this coefficient is insignificantly different from 
zero, indicating that decisions are noisy and unrelated to the gains available, 
especially when consumers believe price differences to be transitory (Giulietti 
et al, 2005) or when consumers do not participate in price search (Sturluson, 
2002).  Secondly,  we  can  provide  a  test  of  hypothesis  1  by  analysing  the 
coefficient N b . We can reject hypothesis 1 if 0 ¹ N b .  
 
To  analyse  consumers’  switching  accuracy,  we  estimate  a  new  form  of 
equation, (3), not previously seen in the literature. We model the monetary 
gains  made  from  consumer  i’s  switch, 
SW
i x ,  as  a  function  of  the  maximum 
available gains, 
P
i x , while controlling for a vector of personal characteristics to 
proxy consumer search costs (which may impede the consumer identifying 
the best offer), 
D
i x , and the number of firms in consumer i’s region,  i N .9  
                                                 
8 We are able to include both 
P
i x  and  i N  as explanatory variables due to the econometrically 
convenient,  and  economically  interesting  fact  that  the  two  variables  have  an  insignificant 
correlation of 0.01.   
9 One may additionally think that the spread of the gains distribution may affect consumers’ 
decisions. The coefficient of variation of each consumer’s distribution of available gains was   10 






i N x x x e b b b a ~ ~ ~
'
~ ~ + + + + =           (3) 
Hypothesis 2 can be rejected if  N b
~
 ¹ 0.    
 
3. Empirical Analysis - The Market  
Households in our dataset are located in one of fourteen newly liberalised 
electricity regions within the UK. By mid-1999 each household could choose 
to  switch  away  from  the  original  regional  incumbent  to  one  of  several 
entrants (with 28 days’ notice and no financial penalty). In June 2000, at the 
time  of  the  survey,  the  number  of  active  entrants  in  each  region  varied 
between 11 and 1710.   
 
Any  active  firm  within  a  region  must  set  tariffs  across  all  three  possible 
payment  types:  credit,  direct  debit  and  prepayment;  in  practice  each  firm 
offered one tariff per payment method. A typical set of tariffs at of the time of 
the survey is provided as an example in Table 2. For a given payment method, 
this feature of the market provides an equivalence between the number of 
firms and the number of tariffs a consumer faces. However, it is unclear how 
to  define  the  number  of  firms  when  one  considers  joint  ownership.  For 
example in Table 2, at the time of the survey, tariffs branded under London 
Electricty  and  SWEB  were  both  owned  by  Electricité  de  France,  while 
Southern and Scottish Hydro were jointly owned by Southern and Scottish. 
The  relevant  consideration  for  our  purpose  is  how  the  consumer  would 
                                                                                                                                            
initially  included  in  equations  (2)  and  (3),  but  was  later  dropped  as  it  did  not  prove 
significant.  
10 Since the time of the survey the market has seen heavy consolidation. See Waddams-Price 
(2005) for details on the UK’s energy market liberalisation and its effects.   11 
regard the options. Listed tariff information typically provides all branded 
tariffs separately and so the consumer faced with this information, probably 
ignorant of ownership details, would view the number of firms as the number 
of branded tariffs presented. We use this classification to define the number of 
firms, but re-classifying the number of firms as the number of jointly owned 
enterprises makes only a minor difference11 and provides qualitatively similar 
estimation results.  
 
Table 2: Tariffs for Sample Region12 - Midlands, June 2000 
 
Electricty Supplier Credit Payment  Direct Debit Payment Prepayment
Fixed Rate1 Rate2 Fixed Rate1 Rate2 Fixed Rate1 Rate2
British Gas (1) 0 10.57 5.65 0 9.01 5.65 0 10.28 6.17
Eastern TXU Energi (2) 2848 6.38 6.28 1856 6.38 6.28 3713 6.72
East Midland 3541 5.99 2491 5.99 5116 5.99
London Electricity (3) 3048 5.86 3048 5.86 9202 7.80
MEB (incumbent) (4) 2159 6.72 2159 6.72 3734 6.72
Northern Electric+Gas (5) 0 9.14 5.68 0 8.19 5.68 3990 6.52
Northern Energy Supply UK 3117 6.62 2657 6.42 3745 6.62
Norweb Energi 4922 5.30 4637 5.21 3734 6.72
Seeboard (6) 0 11.97 5.34 0 10.82 5.34 4112 6.72
Scottish Hydro 1873 6.08 1873 6.08 3990 6.52
Scottish Power 5408 5.26 4883 5.01 3734 6.72
Southern 3116 6.29 3053 6.16 3990 6.52
SWALEC 1966 5.67 1886 5.44 3734 6.71
SWEB (7) 3045 5.86 3045 5.86 4523 7.39
Utility Link (8) 3595 7.25 3595 7.25 7388 7.68
Yorkshire (9) 5561 5.76 5561 5.76 8669 5.76
Independent Energy 4982 5.46 4026 5.46 4497 7.77  
  
                                                 
11 Using the branded firms’ classification the average number and standard deviation of firms 
faced  across  the  sample  is  16.3  (1.66),  while  under  the  joint  ownership  classification  the 
figures are 15.1 (1.94). 
12 Tariffs may include a standing charge (Fixed), and up to two rates. Rate 1 (pence/kWh) is 
charged for values of consumption below the breakpoint and Rate 2 is charged on all other 
consumption.  Breakpoints  are  indicated  in  the  numerical  footnotes  given  below  where 
additional tariff information is also provided. (1) Break Point 900kWh (2) Break Point 598kWh 
(3) 3% off Direct Debit if bill exceeds £10.50 (4) 3% off Direct Debit (5) Break Point 1092kWh 
(6) Break Point 182kWh, £8.40 off credit and direct debit (7) 3% off Direct Debit (8) £10.00 off 
direct debit if prompt payment (9) £8.40 off credit, £14.70 off direct debit. 
   12 
Some descriptive statistics of bills for three example consumption levels are 
shown in Table 3, where all bills are measured annually in pence. As in all 
regions, direct debit is cheapest and prepayment most expensive, reflecting in 
part, the relative costs of the payment methods for the suppliers (Waddams 
Price, 2005)13. Most consumers can choose between any of the three payment 
methods, but those who are in debt to their supplier may be constrained to 
use  prepayment.  For  this  reason  and  because  of  their  greater  budgetary 
control,  prepayment  meters  are  predominantly  used  by  lower  income 
households (Electricity Association, 2001). 
 
Table 3 – Descriptive Statistics of Potential Bills for Example Region 
 
 
Payment Consumption (kW h):
M ethod Descriptive Statistic 1650 3300 5444
Credit Incumbent Bill 13247 24335 38756
M ax bill / incumbent bill 1.17 1.13 1.11
M ean bill / incumbent bill 1.00 0.95 0.92
M in bill / incumbent bill 0.76 0.77 0.78
Number of suppliers with bill>incumbent 10 2 2
Coefficeint of variaton of bills 0.09 0.08 0.08
Direct Debit Incumbent Bill 12850 23605 37593
M ax bill / incumbent bill 1.13 1.12 1.12
M ean bill / incumbent bill 0.97 0.94 0.95
M in bill / incumbent bill 0.70 0.75 0.78
Number of suppliers with bill>incumbent 7 2 2
Coefficeint of variaton of bills 0.10 0.08 0.08
Prepayment Incumbent Bill 14822 25910 40331
M ax bill / incumbent bill 1.49 1.35 1.28
M ean bill / incumbent bill 1.08 1.05 1.03
M in bill / incumbent bill 0.94 0.93 0.92
Number of suppliers with bill>incumbent 7 6 5
Coefficeint of variaton of bills 0.14 0.11 0.10  
 
The  tariffs  show  that  significant  gains  are  available  from  switching  at  all 
consumption levels and payment methods. However the prepayment market 
                                                 
13 The higher charges for prepayment tariffs, which are used predominantly by lower income 
households, have been the focus of concern by some poverty lobby groups.   13 
is generally more expensive, offers lower potential gains from switching, and 
includes more entrants pricing above the incumbent.  
 
The Data 
The dataset of switching decisions comes from a face-to-face survey of 3417 
consumer households in the UK residential electricity market, conducted in 
June  2000  by  the  Electricity  Association  (2001).  The  survey  is  intentionally 
biased  towards  low-income  households,  and  is  not  representative  of 
electricity consumers as a whole. This focus reflected government concerns 
that the benefits of competition would not be shared equally by low income 
consumers (DTI, 1998).  Of the 3417 responses, only 3097 were useable for our 
purposes  because  of  inconsistent  responses;  the  characteristics  of  the 
discarded  group  did  not  differ  largely  from  those  of  other  respondents14. 
Within  the  sample,  394  (13%)  households  had  switched  suppliers.  This  is 
broadly consistent with the national proportion of such consumers who had 
switched supplier at that time (OFGEM, 2004). Prices were obtained from the 
Which? website (www.which.co.uk) for each supplier and payment method 
in each region at bimonthly periods between the opening of the market and 
the time of the survey. 
 
Variables 
Variables are described with summary statistics in Table 4. The demographic 
variables include the households’ size, social class, income, age, payment type 
                                                 
14 Most notably, the discarded group were significantly poorer, of lower social class and younger. We 
choose not to correct for this small selection effect due to our already complex estimations. This is 
unlikely to alter our hypothesis conclusions.   14 
and  the  marital  status  of  the  respondent,  which  have  been  found  to  be 
significant in previous switching studies. Variables marked with ^ are only 
defined for switching consumers. 
 




Name Variable Definition Mean  Deviation
aware The household is aware that they can switch suppliers 0.72 0.45
sw The houshold switched suppliers 0.13 0.33
Consumer Variables
gainmax Maximum gains from switcing available (annual, pence) 4376 5839
swgain^ The actual gains received from switching (annual, pence) 1255 4087
N Number of alternative firms in local market 15.33 1.66
credit Payment method: credit 0.24 0.43
dirdebit Payment method: direct debit 0.11 0.31
prepay Payment method: prepayment 0.66 0.47
highsoc Household social grade: A, B or C1 0.23 0.42
midsoc Household social grade: C2 or D 0.49 0.50
lowsoc Household social grade: E 0.28 0.45
highinc Household income: £25000 + 0.11 0.31
midinc Household income: £12500-£25000 0.21 0.41
lowinc Household income: Less than £12500 0.48 0.50
incref Income status refused 0.20 0.40
kids Number of children under 16 in household 0.87 1.20
adults Number of adults over 16 in household 1.86 0.94
age Age of respondent 43.9 16.9
only75 The household has only adults over 75 years of age 0.04 0.19
disable The household collects some form of disability benefit 0.19 0.46
single  The household respondent is single 0.23 0.42
married The household respondent is married 0.52 0.50
exmar The household respondent is widowed or divorced 0.25 0.43
arrears The household has electricty arrears 0.04 0.20
gassw The household has previously switched gas supplier 0.23 0.42
nogas The household has no mains gas supply 0.15 0.36
rent The household lives in rented accommodation 0.55 0.50
Control Variables
change  The household has changed payment method 0.32 0.47
compest A company estimate of consumption has been used 0.04 0.19
dual^ The household switched for dual supply reasons 0.11 0.31
service^ The household switched with concerns about supplier quality 0.05 0.21
Sample Size 3097  
 
 
We first discuss the variables used to measure the gains available and the 
gains  made  from  switching.  If  consumers  are  switching  for  price  reasons 
alone, the gain from switching from firm 0 to firm j is the associated change in   15 
consumer  surplus,  ∫ 0 ) (
p
j p dp p D ,  where  D(p)  is  the  consumer’s  demand 
function, and  i p is the tariff of firm i. Since we cannot estimate consumers’ 
demand functions directly, we approximate the change in consumer surplus 
by the change in expenditure15, i.e.  ∫ 0 ) (
p
j p dp p D T t j C p p = - @ ) ( 0 , where  T t C =  is 
the  consumer’s  consumption,  derived  from  a  self-reported  estimate  of  the 
consumer’s  electricity  bill.  This  assumption  is  reasonable  in  two  respects. 
Firstly,  short-run  demand  for  electricity  is  inelastic  (Baker  et  al,  1989). 
Secondly, we found no major differences in results when we confined our 
estimations  to  a  sub-group  of  1601  consumers  who  indicated  they  had 
perfectly price inelastic demand and a consumption pattern that was stable 
over time16. We define the following measures of consumer gains. GAINMAX 
measures the maximum gains from switching to the best available offer for 
that  payment  method  and  SWGAIN  measures  the  gains  actually  made  by 
those consumers who switched. Formally, 
 
SWGAIN  = 
SW
i x     @   T t sw C p p = - ) ( 0       (4) 
GAINMAX  = 
P
i x     @   T t C p p = - ) ( min 0       (5) 
 
                                                 
15 Giulietti et al (2005) make a similar assumption for gas.  
16 The subgroup consisted of households that replied “the same” to the questions: Q. If the 
cost of electricity went down would you use more electricity or use the same electricity and 
use the savings for something else? and Q. If the cost of electricity went up would you use 
less electricity or use the same electricity?, and “No” to the following questions, Q. Has there 
been any change in your household’s circumstance in the last 2-3 years that affected your fuel 
consumption? and Q. Has your household’s electricity ever been disconnected because of 
unpaid electricity bills?   16 
The use of a self-reported bill measure to create a consumer estimate of their 
own  consumption  for  calculating  these  gains  allows  us  to  focus  on  the 
consumers’  own  perceived  gains,  given  their  consumption  beliefs.  We 
therefore  exclude  mistakes  that  may  arise  from  consumers’  incorrect 
consumption estimates.  
 
Within the full sample, 4% could not provide expenditure estimates and so 
their  consumption  was  calculated  instead  from  their  suppliers’  bill 
information. We control for this group of consumers by creating the dummy 
variable  COMPEST,  which  later  proved  insignificant,  despite  findings 
elsewhere that show the divergence of the two parties’ estimates (Mathieu 
and Waddams Price, 2005).  
 
We calculated maximum and realised gains assuming no change in payment 
method when consumers switched. To check the validity of this assumption, 
we used information on whether respondents had changed payment method 
while at their current address.  For the 32% of households who had done so, 
we included a variable CHANGE, which proved insignificant.  We conclude , 
surprisingly, that including any change in  payment method at the time of 
switching would not have affected our results. To identify the relevant tariffs 
at  the  date  of  switching  (which  was  unknown,  but  had  occurred  since 
liberalisation,  eighteen  months  before  our  survey)  we  used  the  dataset  of 
tariffs for all the suppliers in each region. Tariffs were stable between October 
1999 and April 2000, so only two set of tariffs, those prevalent in this period   17 
and in June 2000 are relevant.  Two sets of results were estimated, using each 
of  these  tariff  sets;  these  differed  very  little.  As  the  rate  of  switching  was 
accelerating at the national level we report the results using the most recent 
June 2000 tariffs. 
 
4. Estimation and Results  
We first report some descriptive statistics of the incidence of consumer errors. 
Under-switching, which may arise from switching costs, is not the main focus 
of the current enquiry, but we note that of the 1834 consumers who were 
aware of the option to switch but did not choose to do so, 98.8% could have 
reduced their bill by switching suppliers, realising an average annual saving 
of £43.59 (standard deviation of 67.23).  
 
Of  more  direct  interest  for  our  hypotheses  are  the  incidences  of  over-
switching and inaccuracy amongst the switching consumers. These errors are 
shown graphically in Figure 1 for the 394 households who switched. High 
levels  of  over-switching  were  found,  as  32%  (st.dev  47)  of  switching 
consumers  changed  to  an  entrant  charging  more  than  the  firm  they  were 
switching from, resulting in an average annual loss of £16.53 (43.33).  Further, 
the average annual gain from switching made by consumers was only £12.55 
(40.87), which compares very poorly to the average maximum annual gain 
available to them of £53.91 (43.84). Consumers therefore displayed high levels 
of inaccuracy by appropriating only 23% of the available surplus, with only 
7% of those who switched choosing the supplier which yielded the maximum   18 
surplus. Such foregone gains are consistent with a search cost explanation. As 
in Economides et al (2005) we find that the incidence of benefits and errors 
from switching varies widely across consumers.  
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We  now  consider  the  first  of  our  estimations.  We  estimate  equation  (2), 
following Giulietti et al (2005) by using a bivariate probit model with sample 
selection.  This enables us to control for awareness of choice of supplier (28% 
of the households were not aware of the possibility of switching).   
 
Formally, we define a first latent variable to model consumer i’s awareness 
and a second latent variable to model the decision to switch, once aware.  This 









i SWi N x x y e b b b + + + = 5 4
'
3 ' *           (7) 
 
   19 
The consumer is aware of the possibility of switching if  0
* > AWi y , and 0 if not; 
and switches only if  0
* > SWi y  and  1
* = AWi y . Model estimation assumes that the 
two error terms  SWi AWi e e ,  are distributed with a bivariate normal distribution 
and an unspecified correlation ofr  (see Giulietti et al for more details).   
 
In equation (6), following Giuletti et al, we model awareness as a function of 
individual demographics, 
D
i x ; while we also add the number of firms in the 
consumer’s region,  i N , to reflect potential increase in promotional activities. 
Equation  (7)  replicates  equation  (2),  while  adding  the  variables  CHANGE, 
COMPEST as discussed earlier to control for changes in payment method, 
and the use of company’s bill estimates respectively17,18. 
 
Results of the estimation are reported in Table 5 where marginal effects are 
calculated for the average consumer.  The awareness equation acts only as a 
control stage in our study, but the coefficients are as expected and consistent 
with previous studies.  For the average consumer, awareness increases with 
the number of suppliers, is higher for those in middle and high social groups, 
increases with age but at a decreasing rate, is lower for those who are single, 
higher for those who have switched gas and lower for those who do not have 
a gas supply.  The fact that awareness increases with the number of firms, but 
                                                 
17 To  identify  the  model  we  hypothesise  that  a  consumer  who  rents  their  property  or  a 
consumer who has arrears with their current company should not differ in awareness from 
the average consumer, but may be limited in their ability to switch due to the influence of a 
landlord or their current supplier. Thus, the variables RENT and ARREARS are omitted from 
the first stage equation. Results seem robust to this choice.  
18 We were forced to omit the variable capturing low social class from all of the regressions as 
it was highly correlated with our low income variable, LOWINC.     20 
is  lower  for  prepayment  consumers  is  consistent  with  a  strong  marketing 
effect,  since  entrants  were  much  more  reluctant  to  recruit  prepayment 
consumers, who were perceived to be less profitable.  
 




aware Effect z sw | aware Effect z
gainmax 0.00 -0.34
N 0.14 2.74** N 0.01 1.61
dirdebit 0.16 1.49 dirdebit 0.06 1.93
prepay 0.05 1.57 prepay -0.17 -2.54**
highsoc -0.09 -4.56** highsoc 0.00 0.18
midsoc 0.08 3.40** midsoc 0.00 -0.02
highinc 0.06 2.93** highinc -0.04 -1.45
midinc 0.00 -0.04 midinc (base case)
lowinc 0.02 0.86 lowinc 0.01 0.47
incref -0.04 -1.61 incref -0.02 -1.44
kids -0.01 -0.67 kids 0.01 1.21
adults 0.01 1.05 adults 0.01 1.40
age 0.01 2.92** age 0.00 0.39
age2 0.00 -2.73** age2 0.00 -0.57
only75 -0.10 -1.61 only75 -0.03 -0.81
disable -0.01 -0.31 disable 0.02 1.14
single -0.05 -2.07* single -0.02 -1.38
exmar -0.06 -2.31* exmar 0.00 0.15
arrears - - arrears 0.01 0.29
gassw 0.07 3.81** gassw 0.17 2.62**
nogas -0.21 -7.74** nogas -0.02 -0.66
rent - - rent 0.00 0.29








LR 0.07  
 
                                                 
19 All significant tests are indicated by * for the 5% level and by ** for the 1% level. Where 
applicable, coefficients are relative to the base case of a consumer who is married, of low 
social  class,  middle  income  and  who  pays  by  credit.  The  Wald  statistic  tests  the  joint 
significance  of  all  coefficients.  Rho  refers  to  the  estimated  correlation  between  the  two 
equations’ error terms, which tested to be significantly different from zero by a LR test. 
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Estimates of the second stage reveal that consumers’ decisions to switch, once 
they are aware of the possibility, are not responsive to the maximum savings 
available, providing some support for the presence of consumer under- or 
over-switching20.    However,  we  cannot  reject  Hypothesis  1,  as  switching 
decisions seem unrelated to the number of competitors and so mistakes in this 
regard appear consistent with rational explanations.  
 
In  our  second  estimation  we  model  the  gains  realised  by  switchers.  We 
employ a standard Heckman correction model to correct for the fact that we 
were only able to observe the gains made from switching for those consumers 
who switched. The first stage models the compressed decision to switch (in 
(8)),  while  the  second  stage  models  the  gains  made from  switching  in  (9), 
which  repeats  equation  (3).  In  addition  we  also  add  the  control  variables 
CHANGE and COMPEST again, while further adding the SERVICE variable 
to  capture  those  switching  consumers  who  considered  firm  quality  to  be 
important,  and  the  variable  DUAL  for  consumers  who  reported  that  they 
switched to benefit from dual supply discounts offered by firms to those who 
purchase both electricity and gas from them21.  
 
                                                 
20 Further results from the control variables indicate that prepayment consumers are 20% less 
likely to switch perhaps reflecting the lack of marketing to this market. An average consumer 
is more likely to switch if she has already switched gas companies, which mirrors a similar 
result found by Giulietti et al. 
21 Identification of the model was made possible by omitting the variables that measured 
whether the consumer had a gas supply or had electricity arrears, NOGAS and ARREARS 
from the second stage. These variables were thought to influence the probability of switching 
suppliers, but not the ability of a consumer to make an efficient choice of supplier, having 
decided to switch.  
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where switch (and, by implication, aware) = 1 if  0
* > SWi y  and to account for 
the  selection  problem,  SWGAIN= SWGi y *  only  if  Switch=1,  and  where  we 
assume  that  the  error  terms  are  distributed  with  a  bivariate  normal 
distribution. 
 
Estimations of the second stage are reported in Table 6 (we do not report the 
first  control  stage,  as  it  repeats  our  previous  switching  estimate).    For  the 
average consumer, we note that, as expected, the maximum gains available 
are a very significant predictor of the gains made, gains are positively related 
to whether the consumer uses a prepayment meter, and negatively influenced 
by household size and whether the consumer is disabled. However the main 
result of interest for hypothesis 2 shows that an increase in the number of 
firms  reduces  the  gains  appropriated  by  the  consumer  relative  to  the 
maximum available. Hypothesis 2 is rejected. Consumer errors in this second 
estimation appear consistent with an explanation of irrationality induced by 
decision complexity, rather than by conventional, rational explanations. 
 
Finally,  the  estimated  correlation  between  the  error  terms  in  the  two 
equations  is  significantly  negative,  -0.97.  Thus,  unobservable  variables 
affecting consumers’ decision making capabilities appear either to encourage  
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switching  while  prompting  inaccuracy,  or  to  discourage  switching  while 
improving  accuracy.  The  first  of  these  explanations  is  consistent  with  the 
widely  publicised  effects  of  misleading,  door-to-door  sales  activities  by 
suppliers which have plagued the industry since its liberalisation22.  
 
 
                                                 
22 This was such a problem in the early stages of opening the energy markets, when our was 
survey was undertaken, that several bodies launched investigations and campaigns to reduce 
such incidences of “mis-selling” (e.g. energywatch, 2002, OFGEM, 2002, OFT, 2004). In 2002, 
London  Electricity  was  fined  two  million  pounds  for  such  activities.  In  addition,  Table  1 
shows that some consumers within our sample cited the efforts of salesmen as an important 
factor in their decision to switch. 
Refer  to  Table  4  for  the  first 
switching  stage.  All  significant 
tests are indicated by *  for the 5% 
level and by **  for the 1% level. 
Where applicable coefficients are 
relative  to  the  base  case  of  a 
consumer who is married, of low 
social  class,  middle  income  and 
who  pays  by  credit.  The  Wald 
statistic tests the joint significance 
of  all  coefficients.  Rho  refers  to 
the estimated correlation between 
the  two  equations’  error  terms, 
which  tested  to  be  significantly 
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5. Discussion and Conclusions 
Our  paper  adds  to  a  small  literature  documenting  evidence  of  consumer 
decision errors in their choice between firms. We confirm previous findings 
that show a large proportion of consumers choose to switch supplier despite 
making apparent losses from doing so, and we provide new evidence to show 
the  poor  accuracy  of  consumers’  decisions.  Roughly  a  third  of  switching 
consumers over-switched in a way that apparently reduced their surplus, and 
in  aggregate,  switching  consumers  only  appropriated  a  quarter  of  the 
maximum gains available. We suggest that these errors can, at least in part, be 
explained by irrational behaviour. Consumers’ mistakes seem to be positively 
related  to  the  number  of  competitors  in  the  market,  consistent  with  an 
information overload hypothesis of consumer confusion. This finding cannot 
easily  be  accounted  for  by  rational  explanations  of  consumer  mistakes 
involving consumers’ perceptions of difference in firm quality or uncertainty 
about their own demand.  
 
Our analysis has some limitations. Firstly, low income consumers are over-
represented in our sample and the magnitude of our estimates may not be 
replicated in the wider consumer population. Secondly, as we have already 
noted, the presence of misleading sales activities that prompt consumers to 
switch inaccurately may provide a secondary explanation for the estimated 
relationship between consumer mistakes and the number of competitors; this 
would be the case if and only if firms rely more heavily on such sales tactics 
as the number of competitors increase.    25 
Our finding that consumers suffer from increased decision noise in markets 
with larger number of competitors is important for competition and consumer 
protection  authorities.  While  increases  in  numbers  of  competitors  may 
increase the total gains available through competition, an increased number 
of  competitors  may  also  limit  the  consumers’  ability  to  appropriate  these 
gains, and further, may damage competition itself by increasing equilibrium 
market power. The interconnection of competition and consumer protection 
policy  in  these  matters  is  clear  when  one  considers  possible  policy 
recommendations.  The  least  controversial  of  these  would  suggest  the 
improvement of consumers’ access to tariff information. Alternatively, it may 
not be the access to information per se that is important, but the access to 
information in an easily understood format. The existence of complex, non-
linear  tariffs  may  contradict  this  principle  and  welfare  could  increase  if 
authorities forced firms to compete with cognitively simpler tariffs. However, 
even  more  controversially,  welfare  improvements  might  be  achievable  if 
authorities  limited  the  number  of  competitors  or  options  faced  by  the 
consumer.  Indeed,  consumers  may  benefit  from  such  a  restriction  of 
competitors  within  our  market.  The  negligible  correlation  (+0.01)  between 
maximum available gains and the number of firms suggests that a restriction 
in the number of firms could leave the level of competition unchanged while 
improving  decision  efficiency,  enabling  consumer  surplus  to  increase.  This 
apparently  perverse  conclusion  parallels  Hortacsu  and  Syverson’s  (2004) 
cautious  advice  that  a  limit  to  the  number  of  U.S.  mutual  funds  could  be   26 
welfare  enhancing  due  to  the  benefits  from  (efficient)  reductions  in  search 
behaviour and increased usage of economies of scale, despite the potential 
losses in competitive effects on price and product variety. The findings of this 
paper provide some further weight to such arguments and more generally, 
suggest that competition authorities should account for possible limitations in 
consumers’ decision making capabilities when designing competition policy. 
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